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Gertner: To Speak or Not to Speak: Musings on Judicial Silence

TO SPEAK OR NOT TO SPEAK:
MUSINGS ON JUDICIAL SILENCE
Nancy Gertner*
There are three branches of government in the American system,
but only two branches may speak forthrightly to the public and
participate in the political dialogue. The executive and the legislature
criticize each other, and their third branch, the judiciary, virtually
without limitation. The judiciary, more reticent by temperament and
rule, is supposed to speak only through formal opinions, general
discourses on the administration of justice, and the occasional scholarly
talk or article.
In the past, this arrangement made institutional sense. The
executive and the legislature were elected, and directly accountable to
the public. They had to participate in the political process, with all the
tools at their disposal. The federal judiciary, appointed for life, did not
have to speak outside of its usual channels of communication.' The
pressures to "announce" one's views on a host of legal views-pressures
which elected judges felt-were or should be irrelevant to federal judges
with life tenure.
The arrangement even made political sense: While judges have
been criticized, even attacked throughout our history, it is fair to say that
the institution as a whole and surely individual judges were respected,
for the most part. That respect was obviously essential; the legitimacy of
the institution rested on it.2

*

Judge, United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.

1. Elected judges obviously involve a different problem. See Republican Party of Minn. v.
White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding that Minnesota Supreme Court's canon of judicial
conduct, which prohibited candidates for judicial election from announcing their views on disputed
legal or political issues, violated the First Amendment).
2. The power of judges, Alexis de Tocqueville observed, "is enormous, but it is the power of
public opinion. They are all-powerful as long as the people respect the law; but they would be
impotent against popular neglect or contempt of the law." ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY
INAMERICA 90 (J. Mayer & M. Lemer eds. 1966).
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Recent trends, however, challenge old approaches to judicial
speech. I offer a few preliminary observations although my evidence is
anecdotal; more research and more data is necessary to test whether the
apparent changes are real. The media has dramatically changed. There is
unparalleled interest in trials, indictments, and sentencings, and "24/7"
coverage. Judicial decisions have become the subject of political
campaigns; criminal justice issues-who is "soft on crime," who is
not-are fodder for politicians as well as for the hosts of talk shows.
And the gloves are off in these discussions. There are unbridled attacks
on judges not only by the media, but by legislators, outraged by this or
that decision. Bills are proposed whose sole purpose is to strip the courts
of power. Judicial selection-even in states that do not elect their
judges-has become more and more politicized.3
Historians may say that there is nothing new here.4 There were the
"Impeach Earl Warren" stickers, Roosevelt's court packing, etc., and
historians may well be right. The differences I describe may not be
qualitative, but quantitative. 5 Changes in the media may provide a
megaphone to the usual debates about judges, now to a degree and at a
decibel level never before seen. New outlets, the internet for one, may
well exacerbate the trend.6
3. See Gerald E. Rosen, Distinguished Brief Award Speech: Remarks of Judge Gerald
Rosen, Thomas M Cooley Law School Distinguished BriefAward Banquet: Judicial Independence
in an Age of Political and Media Scrutiny (July 19, 1997), 14 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 685, 691
(1997) (noting "judges, with our guarantee of life tenure, financial security, and no obligation to
reflect public opinion, make a choice target for political spinmeisters, radio talk show hosts and
attack ad operatives, particularly since the Cannons [sic] of Ethics prohibit us from joining in the
political fray and fighting back.").
4. Roscoe Pound stated in his 1906 speech, "Dissatisfaction with the administration of
justice is as old as law." Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729 (1906), reprinted in 8 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 6 (1956).
Indeed, even the Federalist Papers predicted public criticism of federal judges. Hamilton writes that
judges would sometimes be plagued by "the effects of those ill humors, which the arts of designing
men or the influence of particular conjectures sometimes disseminate among the people
themselves." THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
5. See generally Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science
Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871 (1997). See also Andrew Cohen,
The Dangers of Holding Judges in Contempt, WASH. POST, July 7, 2002, at B02 ("It's hard to
remember a time in our recent history when federal judges were subjected to so much disrespect and
vitriol from virtually every comer of America. It's not a good sign."); ABA COMM. ON SEPARATION
OF POWERS AND JUD. INDEPENDENCE, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY (1997) (describing the tenor of

recent attacks on judges and the courts as characterized by "an unfortunate shrillness"), available at
www.abanet.org/govaffairs/judiciary/reporthtml (1997).
6. As one commentator noted, improvements in technology means that attacks on judges
spread more quickly and reach further. Thomas L. Cooper, Attacks on Judicial Independence: The
PBA Response, 72 PA. B.A. Q. 60, 62 n.15 (2001) (citation omitted).
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I do not make these observations because I believe for a moment
that judges should not be criticized. Far from it. We are public figures;
we are accountable to the public.7 Nor do I address in this piece very
important concerns about the impact of these developments on judicial
independence. 8 Finally, this is not a paean for judicial entitlement to the
same "free speech" rights as other officials. Plainly, the unique
obligations of the judicial role require unique restrictions on speech and
association.
Rather my focus here is simply on the impact of judicial silence on
the public debate in a host of areas, especially given the cacophony of
other speakers. Judicial silence in the face of public "vitriol" 9 not only
has an impact on the respect given to the institution, but also on
legislation dealing with the administration of justice in general, on
criminal justice issues in particular. I postulate the following scenario: If
you don't trust the judge, you don't trust what he or she decides; if you
don't trust what he or she decides, you either will not obey iti0 or, more
likely, you will turn to the political branches to change the rule on which
that decision was based, or keep judges entirely away from the issue.
One result-changes in legislation, often with broad ranging
implications like ever more punitive criminal punishments, I' efforts to
restrict the rights of classes of individuals, more and more court
stripping bills.12
7. As Justice Brandeis noted: "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman." Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities & Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1212 (1999) (quoting RICHARD M. ABRAMS,
INTRODUCTION TO LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT

62 (1967)).
8. For a discussion of the impact of this trend see Rosen, supranote 3.
9. Cohen, supra note 5.
10. As President Andrew Jackson was reported to have said, as to a decision of the Supreme
Court, "John Marshall has made his decision. Now let him enforce it." ARCHIBALD Cox, THE
COURT AND TIlE CONSTITUTION 14 (1987).

11. In a symposium, I suggested that federal mandatory minimums and sentencing guidelines
were a direct result of judges not being accountable or explaining their reasoning for imposing
particular sentences. See Nancy Gertner, Address at University of Southern California Law School's
Judicial Independence and Accountability Symposium, Program & Webcast Archive, available at
http://www.usc.edu/dept/law/symposia/judicial/program.html (last modified Nov. 21, 1998).
12. See, e.g., Rosann Greenspan, Gaining Public Trust in the Criminal Legal Process, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 2199, 2100 (1993) (arguing for an affirmative obligation of judges to educate the
public about "constitutional values" and the "limits of punishment"); Tyler, supra note 5, at 874
(arguing that public dissatisfaction with the legal system leads to'efforts to take authority away from
the legal system, including such efforts as the "three strikes you are out" initiative, which limited
judicial sentencing discretion). Nevertheless, I do not mean to suggest that popular punitiveness has
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I want to consider how judges can contribute to the public debate
and in so doing, to reexamine the rules governing judicial speech. It may
well be argued that respect for the judiciary now must be earned; it can
no longer be assumed. The issue is not whether judges should speakwe plainly have to-but when and more importantly how. The old ways
of speaking by judges and courts cannot compete with the new ones. We
have to do more. Precisely what, is the question.
I will first describe the disciplinary rules and statutes that impact on
judicial speech. For the most part, judges are supposed to speak through
their opinions. With certain limitations I describe, they are supposed to
eschew speaking directly to the public. I will then describe the changes
in the media coverage of legal issues, and their impact on the public and
political debate. I conclude that the rules and statutes have not only
failed to reflect the changing times, but recent judicial practices have
exacerbated the problems: At the district court level, there is a premium
on alternative dispute resolution rather than adjudication and writing
decisions. At the appellate level unpublished decisions proliferate; there
is continuing judicial resistance to cameras in the courtroom; and these
trends are exacerbated by the application of the federal sentencing
guidelines, which has transformed the public ceremony of criminal
sentencing into the judicial equivalent of announcing a software code.
One caveat and one admission at the outset. The caveat: I have no
concrete proposals. I wish only to focus a new debate in the face of these
new realities. The admission: I speak from personal experience. I have
3
spoken to the press in a number of settings, with mixed results.
stemmed only from a decline in the legitimacy of courts or an anti-judge bias. Its causes are more
complex.
13. t, along with a number of other judges, have spoken out on the federal sentencing
guidelines. See, e.g., Thanassis Cambanis, Sentencing Law Targets US. Judges in Massachusetts,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 30, 2003, at Al. I have also spoken out on the drug war. See Nancy Gertner,
Remarks at Volunteer Committee of Lawyers Forum, Is the Drug War Forever? (Jan. 29, 1999)
available at http://www.vcl.org/Judges/Gertner J.htm. I have written "op-ed" pieces, most recently
one on community confinement. See Nancy Gertner, Editorial, Too Little Second Chances for
Prisoners,BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 25, 2004, at H 11.At the same time, my efforts to correct a factual
error in public statements made by counsel in a case before me were less successful. See In re
Boston's Children First, 244 F.3d 164, 167-71 (1st Cir. 2002). To make certain that I do not skew
this account, I quote from the Court's description of the facts:
[O]n July 26, the Boston Herald printed an article in which counsel for petitioners
decried the district court's failure to immediately certify a class. Counsel made the
provocative claim that "if you get strip-searched in jail, you get more rights than a child
who is of the wrong color," a reference to the facts of the Mack case. Dave Wedge,
Lawyer Fights School Ruling, Boston Herald, July 26, 2000, at 5. The article said that:
According to [counsel's] motion, Gertner refused to hear arguments to expand the
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school suit to a class action because the affected students may no longer have
standing in the case. But in the strip-search case [Mack], Gertner held just the
opposite opinion.
Id. The article then noted that "Gertner could not be reached for comment." Id.
In a July 28, 2000 letter to the Herald (with copies sent to both parties), Judge
Gertner responded to what she viewed as inaccuracies in the July 26 article. She noted,
correctly, that she had not denied class certification, but had postponed ruling on class
certification until further discovery had occurred. She also noted that, as of the date of
the reporter's interview with counsel, counsel for petitioners had not yet filed the motion
in question. She included with the letter a copy of her procedural order providing for a
hearing on class certification after the issue of standing had been resolved.
On August 4, 2000, the Herald published a follow-up article, which, based on a
telephone interview with Judge Gertner, quoted her as saying:
In the [Mack] case, there was no issue as to whether [the plaintiffs] were injured. It
was absolutely clear every woman had a claim. This is a more complex case.
Dave Wedge, Race-based Admissions Case To Be Heard, Boston Herald, Aug. 4, 2000,
at 24....
Based on Judge Gertner's comments as reported in the August 4 article, petitioners
then moved that the judge recuse herself because her "impartiality might reasonably be
questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
In re Boston's Children First, 244 F.3d at 165-66. The Court agreed in a split decision. Id. at 16771. The original decision was withdrawn following a motion for rehearing. See In re Boston's
Children First, 239 F.3d 59, 59 (1st Cir. 2001). The reissued opinion indicates that the Court split
three-to-three on rehearing, thereby allowing the panel decision to stand. Again, rather than
characterize the decision, I quote another's description of it:
[T]he First Circuit Court of Appeals granted counsel's petition for a writ of mandamus (a
step the court noted was reserved for rare occasions) and required Judge Germer to
recuse herself from any further proceedings in the case. The court based its decision on
its concerns that the public defense made by Judge Gertner of her own order created the
appearance of partiality....
But the case, which involved issues of assignment of elementary school students based
on race in the Boston school system, potentially affected a large number of people, and,
therefore, the effectiveness of an ultimate judicial resolution of the issues depended on
the respect and cooperation of those affected. Leaving the comments made by counsel,
which impugned the integrity of the court, unanswered could jeopardize the public's
willingness to accept the judicial resolution, causing a disregard of judicial authority.
Judge Gertner was not willing to take that risk and took steps to correct the record. As a
consequence, she was removed from the case because the very action of defending the
bench was seen as a threat to the public's perception of it. This case highlights the
dilemma created by such an interpretation of the code of ethics: any attempt to positively
change the public's perception of the judiciary in individual circumstances risks forced
recusal if a higher court detects a hint of prejudgment of an issue. If judicial
independence means maintaining an impartial judiciary, including the appearance of
such, disqualifying judges who respond to attacks on their integrity may be a cure worse
than the ailment.
James L. Morse, A DeclarationAbout JudicialIndependence, 20 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 731, 742-43
(2001).
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CURRENT RULES ON JUDICIAL FREE SPEECH

The Code of Conduct for United States Judges 14 like all codes of
judicial conduct, focuses on maintaining judicial impartiality, the
appearance of justice and assuring public confidence in the judiciary. Its
premise is that the judicial power derives only from the respect given
in turn derives from the public's trust in a
judicial decisions, which
15
impartiality.
judge's
Thus, the Code expressly precludes a federal judge from
participating in "political activity."' 6 At the same time, a judge is
permitted to speak generally about the administration of justice. She may
"speak, write, lecture, teach and participate in other activities concerning
the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice. ' '17 But while
the commentary expressly recognizes that "a judge is in a unique
position to contribute to the improvement of the law, the legal system,
and the administration of justice," these activities are only suggested;
they are not considered essential to the enterprise of judging.1 8 At best,
to many judges, contribution to the improvement of the law means
giving an occasional talk to a bar association, or at a judicial conference,
or to organizations dedicated to the improvement of the law.' 9 Too often,
the audience is relatively narrow: other legal professionals, or a
scholarly audience.
The public, of course, is also concerned with broad issues-the
drug war, sentencing policy-but often its attention is focused on a
given case. The reporter will say: "It is well and good to talk about X,
14. The Code was initially adopted by the Judicial Conference on April 5, 1973, and has been
revised periodically by the Judicial Conference. It derives from the 1972 Model Code of Judicial
Conduct. The American Bar Association ("ABA") adopted the first Canons of Judicial Ethics in
1924. These Canons were unenforceable. In 1972, however, the ABA promulgated the Model Code
of Judicial Conduct, which, unlike its predecessor, specifies a mandatory and enforceable standard
of conduct and behavior. See James R. Noseda, Limiting Off-Bench Expression: Striking a Balance
Between Accountability and Independence, 36 DEPAUL L. REv. 519, 519 n.4, 521-22 (1987), citing
E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 43 (1972).

15. Noseda, supra note 14 at 529.
16. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 7.
17. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 4.
18. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 4C. Indeed, in the ABA Model
Code of Judicial Conduct, this is described as "avocational." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 4(b) (1990).
19. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 4C. Indeed, he or she may even
"express opposition to the persecution of lawyers and judges anywhere in the world" so long as the
judge has determined that that was occasioned by a conflict between the professional
responsibilities of the judge or lawyer and the government policy. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 4B cmt. (1999).
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but what about the woman sentenced yesterday?" Or, "give me an
example of your concerns." Television interviews typically stress the
concrete, the immediate, the cases that dramatize the issue.
Talking about a particular case, however, is problematic for a
judge, particularly a pending case. The judge is to "avoid" making 20a
"public comment on the merits of a pending or impending action,,
although the presumption against public statements about a pending or
impending action "does not extend to public statements made in the
course of the judge's official duties, to the explanation of court
procedures, or to a scholarly presentation made for purposes of legal
education.' Judge Hiller Zobel, for example, in a widely covered trial
of the so-called "Newton Nanny' '22 explained court procedures to the
foreign press after each court session, with counsel present. But while
the rules are presumptive-not mandatory-the case law and the culture
largely keep judges entirely silent. The upshot is that the information on
the administration of justice is not in a form best suited for the public
palate.
Judicial speech is also limited through the rules of disqualification.
Disqualification rules are broader than the ethical rules, through the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a): Any judge "shall" disqualify herself

20. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3A(6) (1999). Reading Canons 3

and 4 together suggests that the very same comment made in court (such as that one case is "more
complicated than another") or a law review article would not lead to disqualification, while they
would if said in an "extrajudicial forum." See Noseda, supra note 14 at 546-47.
21. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3A(6) (1992). Canon 3B(9) of the
ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct is worded slightly differently: "A judge shall not, while a
proceeding is pending or impending in any court, make any public comment that might reasonably
be expected to affect its outcome or impair its fairness or make any nonpublic comment that might
substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing." (emphasis added). MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 3B(9) (1999). In effect, this is an impact test-not simply "avoid making public
comments on a pending case," but do not make comments that have a substantial impact on the
fairness of the proceeding, or might reasonably be expected to do so. Canon 3(A)(6) of the Code of
Conduct for United States Judges derives from an earlier version of the ABA Model Judicial Code.
22. Commonwealth v. Woodward, No. 97-0433, 1997 Mass. Super. LEXIS 213 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Nov. 10, 1997).
23. See generally, Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 773 (2002) ("construing
the clause [Canon 3(A)(6)] to allow 'general' discussions of case law and judicial philosophy turns
out to be of little help in an election campaign. At oral argument, respondents gave, as an example
of this exception, that a candidate is free to assert that he is a "'strict constructionist."' But that, like
most other philosophical generalities, has little meaningful content for the electorate unless it is
exemplified by application to a particular issue of construction likely to come before a court-for
example, whether a particular statute runs afoul of any provision of the Constitution.") (citations
omitted).
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from any proceeding
in which her "impartiality might reasonably be
24
questioned.,
The critical question for judicial speech is how strictly this rule is
enforced: Does the rule limit speech insofar as there are any
consequences to it, however ephemeral? Will courts be appropriately
cautious about the reasonable man or woman test, understanding its
impact on judicial speech? 25 The test is not, or should not be, whether
anyone, with a modicum of knowledge about the case, the judge, or the
situation, or having seen only television sound bites or news captions,
"might" believe the judge to be partial. Rather, it is whether a reasonable
person, knowing "all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the
judge's impartiality. 26 Does a standard that is so vague do more harmby dissuading judges from speaking at all-than good?
2.

CHANGES IN THE MEDIA, THE RULES GOVERNING LAWYER SPEECH

AND THE POLITICAL CLIMATE

We now see "24/7" news coverage of trials and any other court
proceedings that capture the attention of the public. The coverage is
national in scope because of the reach of cable and satellite television.
The media is often proactive, more intrusive than in the past. It is not

24. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2004).
25. As one commentator observed, "appearance of impropriety" standards are "subjective and
immeasurable." They can shift with time, the decisionmakers, etc. See Noseda, supra note 14, at
532-533. Noseda cites In re Bonin as an example of the risk of the enforcement of these provisions.
Id. at 535, citing In re Bonin, 378 N.E.2d 669 (1978). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
suspended and censured Chief Judge Bonin following his attendance at a controversial public
lecture, "Sex and Politics in Massachusetts." Proceeds from ticket sales were to benefit a group of
criminal defendants indicted for their alleged involvement with an illicit homosexual sex ring. See
In re Bonin, 378 N.E.2d 669, 672 (1978). The case was pending before the Supreme Court. Noseda
cites to criticism of Bonin's censure, suggesting that it was linked more to his proposed court
reforms, than to his attendance at the lecture. Noseda, supra note 14 at 536.
Likewise, Noseda points to the controversy surrounding Judge Abner Mikva's activities
on behalf of the American Bar Association's Individual Rights and Responsibilities section.
Specifically, Judge Mikva sought to recruit women, minority and politically liberal lawyers in the
Bar Association. A complaint from the Washington Legal Foundation, alleging that Judge Mikva's
activities "compromise the appearance of impartiality by identifying him with the controversial
aims of the section," led to his decision to terminate his involvement with the section's recruitment
efforts. Id.at 537-538. See also James Robertson, A Distant Mirror: The Sheppard Case From the
Next Millennium, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 391, 398 (2001) ("[A]ppearance of impropriety' is a
dangerous genie; it can be released from its lamp by anyone who calls its name.").
26. See El Fenix de Puerto Rico v. M/Y Johanny, 36 F.3d 136, 140 (lst Cir. 1994) (quoting
Home Placement Serv., Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 739 F.2d 671, 675 (1st Cir. 1984)).
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unheard of for witnesses to be paid to publicize their stories.27 Lawyer
commentators shape the public's view of the case. The content of
television or radio shows is often the functional equivalent of the tabloid
press.
There are appropriately few limitations on what the press can
publish and say about a pending case. In Nebraska Press Association v.
Stuart,28 for example, the Court reversed, as a prior restraint, a gag order
that had been entered in connection with a highly publicized murder
trial. The Court noted that such an order was subject to a substantial
burden of justification, notably "that further publicity, unchecked, would
so distort the views of potential jurors that 12 could not be found who
a just
would, under proper instructions, fulfill their sworn duty to render
29
verdict exclusively on the evidence presented in open court.,
Likewise, ethical constraints on lawyer speech have been relaxed in
the face of First Amendment challenges. In Chicago Council of Lawyers
v. Bauer,the Seventh Circuit struck down Disciplinary Rule 7-107 of the
ABA rules, because it did not require a showing of serious and
immediate harm.3 ° In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, the Supreme Court
found unconstitutional ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6
(1981) as that Rule had been applied and interpreted in the State of
Nevada. Five Justices concluded that lawyer speech in connection with
the representation of clients in pending cases may be regulated under a
"substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard so long as it
punishes "only speech that creates a danger of imminent and substantial
harm.",3 ' The Rule was unconstitutional, however, because it was vague
as interpreted by the Nevada Supreme Court. Four Justices disagreed,

27. Eileen A. Minnefor, Looking for Fair Trials in the Information Age: The Need for More
Stringent Gag OrdersAgainst Trial Participants,30 U.S.F. L. REv. 95, 99-100 n. 17 (1995).
28. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
29. Id. at 569. In fact, one commentator suggests that what the Court is really saying is that
the speech at issue in NebraskaPress Ass 'n is effectively political speech. While media reporting of
facts about a high-profile court case has the potential to influence the case's outcome; the speech at
issue in the case had the affect of influencing public policy, as was an important "handmaiden of
effective judicial administration." Id. at 559-60 (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350
(1966)); see generally Christopher J. Peters, Adjudicative Speech and the First Amendment, 51
UCLA L. REv. 705 (2004). Peters distinguishes between political speech, which is intended to
influence public policy, and adjudicative speech, which is intended to influence the outcome of a
given proceeding. Id. at 753-76.
30. See Chicago Counsel of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 249 (7th Cir. 1975).
31. See Gentile v. State Bar ofNev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1036 (1991).
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holding that even the
standard ofjustification in the Rule ran afoul of the
32
First Amendment.

Obviously, there are no legal limits on what legislators and officials
say about judges. Within the past decade, attacks on sitting judges have
been widely reported.33 They have ranged from vitriolic criticism, to
suggestions that the judges should resign or face impeachment
proceedings.
The chorus of attacks on judges from all quarters is not without
consequences as many others have noted.34 And apart from their impact
on judicial decision-making, they have a direct impact on the public
discourse in a variety of areas, and specifically on legislation involving
crime and sentencing.3 5 So long as judges do not participate in these
debates, their outcome will be more and more skewed. Two
phenomenon have been widely reported. On the one hand, studies
suggest the public links courts to increases in crime, and believes that
increasing punishment and limiting procedural protections is essential.36
At the same time, studies also suggest that "when the public is informed
about or experienced with the criminal process, they care deeply about
procedural values and do not consider the courts 'soft' on crime." 37 The
enterprise then is to make certain that the courts reach out to the public
to "nurture respect
for constitutional values and understanding the limits
38
of punishment."

32.

See id. at 1054.

33. See Judge Paul L. Friedman, Civility, JudicialIndependence and the Role of the Bar in
PromotingBoth, 2002 FED. CTS. L. REV. 4, * 11, citing Christopher P. Banks, The Politics of Court
Reform in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 84 JUDICATURE 34, 37 (2000); Richard Carelli, ABA
President Shestack Addresses Attempts at JudicialIntimidation, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 3,
1998, at 4; Bob Herbert, Editorial, A Plan to Intimidate Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2000, at A29;
Herman Schwartz, One Man's Activist: What Republicans Really Mean When They Condemn
Judicial Activism, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 1997, at 10. In 1996, President Clinton and some

Senators and Congressman publicly discussed the impeachment or resignation of Judge Harold Baer
because of a suppression decision. Friedman, supranote 33, at * 18.
34. See Friedman, supra note 33, at *12; Judith S. Kaye, Safeguarding a Crown Jewel:
JudicialIndependence andLawyer Criticism of Courts, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 703, 711 (1997).
35. See Gertner, supra note 11; Greenspan, supra notel2.
36. See Greenspan, supra note 12, at 2199.
37. Id. at 2200; see also PETER H. Rossi & RICHARD A. BERK, NATIONAL SAMPLE SURVEY:
PUBLIC OPINION ON SENTENCING FEDERAL CIMES 97 (1997) (finding that public opinion on the

appropriate sentence moderated as more mitigating facts about the offense and the offender were
disclosed)
38. See Laura Storto, GettingBehind the Numbers: A Report on FourDistricts and What They
Do Below the Radar Screen, (manuscript on file with author).
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TO SPEAK OR NOT TO SPEAK

3.

THE INADEQUACY OF THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE

If, according to the ethical rules, judges are mostly to speak through
their opinions, recent trends are especially troubling. Professor Judith
Resnik reports on the decline' of judicial adjudication, in favor of
mediation, a low visibility resolution of cases.3 9 At a recent forum of
judges in the First Circuit, judges were told, in effect, that "if you have
to write a decision about the case," you have failed in your obligations as
a judge. In judicial education seminars, one half day-an optional one at
that-is reserved for judicial opinion writing; the sessions on case
management, mediation, alternative dispute resolution are mandatory
and considerably longer. Courts of appeals have exacerbated the trend
with unpublished decisions, resolving the case at bar but not for wider
circulation. 0
Opinions--even when written and published-are rarely drafted
with a view to the public's understanding. To a degree, computer
assisted research has exacerbated the problem. It is far easier to simply
"cut and paste" one complex and obtuse quote from one case onto
another, than it is to recharacterize the issues in terms that the public will
understand.
Nor are courts attentive to the demands of the media. Decisions are
released when the courts are ready to release them. This could well mean
the publication of a lengthy and complex opinion, just at the time of the
media's deadlines, eliminating any chance to carefully review and
analyze it.
Some courts have retained public relations officers, or official
response teams to respond to articles about judges and cases. The
problem is training and timing. Unless these representatives take into
account the exigencies of the news cycle, the response will either not
make the papers, or be ignored. 4'
39. See Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 378 (1982) ("As managers,
judges learn more about cases much earlier than they did in the past. They negotiate with parties
about the course, timing, and scope of both pretrial and posttrial litigation. These managerial
responsibilities give judges greater power. Yet the restraints that formerly circumscribed judicial
authority are conspicuously absent. Managerial judges frequently work beyond the public view, off
the record, with no obligation to provide written, reasoned opinions, and out of reach of appellate
review.").
40. See Maria Brooke Tusk, Note, No-Citation Rules as a PriorRestrainton Attorney Speech,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1202 (2003).
41. Office of the United States Courts, High-Profile Cases in District Court: How to Work
With the Media, accessed by author at http://jnet.ao.dcnIhighprofiledc/details.htm (internal court
website). The Office of Public Affairs ("OPAF"), at the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,
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Nor is it enough to leave the responsibility for dealing with the
public to lawyers and bar associations. First, the response time of
lawyers or bar associations is frequently too slow, again out of the news
cycle. Second, to the extent that the lawyers are litigants before the
court, particularly the court being criticized, their responses may be
discounted by a skeptical public.42
Finally, following the O.J. Simpson case, the Judicial Conference
terminated the "experiment" on cameras in the courtroom. While state
courts from around the country have had televised proceedings of trials
that are far more controversial than the usual federal court fare, the
Conference prohibited cameras because of their deleterious effect on the

participants .4
43

4.

SUGGESTED RESPONSES

As I noted at the outset, I do not have answers or concrete
proposals. There are the obvious general guidelines: Judges should not
speak when to do so would directly undermine the rights of the litigants
before them, or the integrity of the office. The expression of judicial
opinions-judicial "free speech"-is less important than the fairness of
the proceedings, and the oath of office. But even with this overall
constraint, there are broad and important areas about which judges must
speak because they have a unique contribution to make to the public
debate, because of the consequences of their silence. The line is not easy
serves as a liaison between federal courts and the media, responding to news reporters' questions
about the courts, advising courts on media-related matters, and fielding media inquiries forwarded
by judges and court managers. The AO also advises district and appellate courts on dealing with
high profile cases.
For example, the AO has suggested:
Some courts have found it useful to set aside a certain time each day of a protracted or
complex proceeding for handling news media questions or for dealing with logistical
problems. Managing Notorious Trials advises that these meetings help "prevent
dissemination of incorrect or misconstrued information and might include such matters
as an explanation of a procedural matter or an explanation of a delay or recess .... The
ground rules-whether all comments are "off the record" or "not for attribution" and
whether questions regarding the substance of the case are prohibited-should be
repeated at the start of every informal meeting.
Id.
42. Indeed, Judge Friedman describes the bar's response to criticisms of the D.C. Circuit,
criticisms which he believed threatened judicial independence, as "disappointing." Friedman, supra
note 33, at *21.
43. See Nancy Gertner, The Sunshine Act: Hearings on S.721 Before the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, (Sept. 6, 2000)
(Transcript available at 2000 WL 23832336).
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to draw-between what Judge Reinhardt describes as "the acceptable
platitudes and the forbidden particularities.",44 It is not materially
different from the lines we are obliged to draw in cases throughout our
docket. I have suggestions of two sorts-suggestions within the
traditional parameters of the judicial role, and suggestions which change
that role.
Within the traditional parameters of the judicial role: Judges have to
write opinions that are accessible both to the public and to the media,4 5
to be attentive to the news cycle on their release. Nothing should prevent
the courts from responding-albeit within the four comers of a
decision-so long as Canon 4 is unchanged-to a factual error in press
coverage of a case, or to address the issue in open court.46 After the
Boston Children's decision when the First Circuit disapproved of
something I had said to the press-which would have been entirely
appropriate if uttered in court-I began to consider a new form of
judicial opinion, beginning, "In re Yesterday's Globe. ' ' 7 There are
obvious risks to this approach-that the court may look like it is
coveting publicity, that its judgments are influenced by the prospect of

44. Stephen Reinhardt, JudicialSpeech and the Open Judiciary,28 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 805,
806 (1995).
45. See Robertson, supra note 25, at 398 ("Continuing public confidence in the courts
depends upon our making ourselves and our decisions accessible and understandable to the people.
Citizens want judicial decisions to be rendered by fellow citizens-not by Druids.").
46. For example, I responded in a footnote of a sentencing memorandum to a newspaper
article, see J.M. Lawrence, DeportedDrug Dealer Jailedfor U.S. Return, BOSTON HERALD, May
28, 2003, that mischaracterized the sentence I had handed down.
The article notes that the Court rejected the government's call for a "stiffer sentence,"
without bothering to mention that the Court in fact granted the government's motion for
an upward departure and imposed a sentence above the ordinary range under the
Sentencing Guidelines (which are, themselves, far from lenient). Nor does the article
note that the Court rejected the defense argument for a sentence within the Guidelines at
the low end of the applicable range. To read the article, one would assume that the
sentencing was all about the defendant's eight-year-old state conviction for mayhem and
assault and battery, for which he was sentenced-and served-8-9 years at the maximum
security Massachusetts state prison, MCI Cedar Junction. The sentence I handed down
for the offense in the case before me most assuredly was not just about that prior crime,
as this Memorandum describes. And even in discussing the prior offense, the article
makes no mention of the reasons articulated in open court for not increasing the criminal
history "points" attributable to that offense. In short, the article is a selective, if not
skewed, account of a public sentencing that conveys an impression entirely at odds with
reality....
United States v. Pena, 268 F. Supp. 2d 65, 65 n. 1 (2003) (citations omitted).
47. See discussion supranote 13.
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favorable coverage in the media. 4 8 The judiciary may want to develop
standards as to when a response is appropriate-e.g. when there has
been a factual error in the reporting-and when there has not-e.g. when
the reporter simply disagrees with the court's opinion.
Outside of the traditional judicial role: Education of the public and
officials has to move from an avocational aspect of the job to part of its
central mission. Our court has innovated a "School for Journalists" to
discuss typical errors in the coverage of court proceedings. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has a "bench-bar" committee.
Members of the press are invited to discuss issues of general concern
with our court to maximize the depth of their understanding and to hear
their concerns about the judges. We should not shrink from speaking
directly to the public on precisely the issues that we would otherwise
speak to law schools or bar associations: Judge Stephen Reinhardt
summed it up when he noted:
Some are of the view that it is acceptable to speak to legal audiencesto write law review articles, lecture at bar associations, and teach law
school classes-but that judges should not appear in less erudite fora.
Personally, I do not think that we can justify an ethical code that
prevents us from saying to the general public that which we are willing
to say to the legal elite. I believe that judges may write not only for the
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review but also for the Los Angeles
Times opinion section; that they may speak not only to state or county
bar associations or to the Federalist Society, but may also participate in
lecture series open to the public or even engage in televised
discussions or other public affairs programs. At the same time, judges
should have enough sense not to write for the National Enquirer or to
appear on a program conducted by Geraldo Rivera, Howard Stem, or
Rush Limbaugh. If we can trust judges enough to make decisions that
affect every critical aspect of our lives, we can trust them to make
these judgments as well. In my opinion, no Judicial Speech Code is
necessary; if an individual judge4 9abuses his discretion on occasion, so
be it. The Republic will survive.
Recent technological innovations makes the task of communicating
with the public easier. Electronic Case Filing, now is in courts across the

48. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 117-120 (D.C. Cir. 2001); ef Evan P.
Schultz, Behind the Bench: Is the problem with Judge Jackson that he appearedto be biased? Or
that he appeared to be human?, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 2, 2001, at 50 (discussing criticism of Judge
Jackson's public statements during the Microsoft trial).
49. Reinhardt, supra note 44, at 806-07.
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country, places the court docket on the internet, with pleadings and
transcripts available to the interested public with a click of mouse. There
is no physical or technological impediment to the public knowing
precisely what the courts are doing and why. Indeed, nothing I have
suggested here would even run afoul of the existing rules.
The judiciary's approach to communicating with the public it
serves has to change. If it does not, if our voice remains silent in debates
on public policy, and we become irrelevant to the process, we have only
ourselves to blame. As Oliver Wendell Holmes observed:
I trust that no one will understand me to be speaking with disrespect of
the law, because I criticize it so freely. I venerate the law, and
especially our system of law, as one of the vastest products of the
human mind.... But one may criticize even what one reveres. Law is
show less than
the business to which my life is devoted, and I should
50
devotion if I did not do what in me lies to improve it.

50.

Talbot D'Alemberte, Searchingfor the Limits of JudicialFree Speech, 61 TUL. L. REV.

611, 651 (1987) (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS, 167, 170, 194 (1920)).
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